Unreasonable, The Wednesbury Test

The following principles were stated in the judgment of Lord Greene, the Master of the Rolls, in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223:

It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word "unreasonable" in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting "unreasonably."

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Good Order (Apparent Good Order)

In Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Company Ltd v Retla Steamship Company [1970] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 91:

The term ‘apparent good order and condition’ when used in this Bill of Lading with reference to iron, steel or metal products does not mean that the goods when received, were free of visible rust or moisture. If the shipper so requests, a substitute Bill of Lading will be issued omitting the above definition and setting forth any notations which may appear on the mates' or tally clerks' receipts.

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Ex Turpi Causa Non Oritur Actio(from a dishonorable cause an action does not arise)

Alexander v Rayson [1936] 1 K.B. 169, at p.182:

It is settled law that an agreement to do an act that is illegal or immoral or contrary to public policy, or to do any act for a consideration that is illegal or immoral or contrary to public policy, is unlawful and therefore void. But it often happens that an agreement which in itself is not unlawful is made with the intention of one or both parties to make use of the subject-matter for an unlawful purpose, that is to say, a purpose that is illegal, immoral or contrary to public policy. …

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Krysha (Крыша)

Per Gloster J in Berezovsky v Abramovich [2012] EWHC 2463 (Comm)  at paras 51-54:

51. The concept of krysha (literally Russian for "roof") played an important role in this case. The meaning of the concept was effectively common ground as between the respective historical experts and the parties. In a society which is not governed by the rule of law, people devise alternative structures to govern their relations, based not on law but on power. Krysha is an alternative system of obligation; the classic product of a society where businessmen cannot count on the protection of the law, either because the law is itself defective or because the administrative and judicial agencies charged with its enforcement cannot be relied upon to do so. Where there is no effective law, or no effective legal process of enforcement, relationships are governed instead by power. It was common ground among the experts that the situation in Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s was that, although there were laws, the legal processes were defective..

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Eligible

Per Lord Chelmsford in Baker v Lee (1860) 8 HL. Cas. 495:

The word ‘eligible’ as here used by the Master of the Rolls is ambiguous. It may mean either "legally qualified" or "fit to be chosen".

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Advance Freight

In Thompson v Gillespy (1855) 5 E & B 209 per Lord Campbell CJ at p.223:

If she sailed on the voyage in a seaworthy condition, the merchant was to advance one fourth of the freight, which he could not recover back if the ship, having so sailed, should afterwards be lost by the perils of the sea, without having delivered any part of her cargo. …But [the shipowner] could not have the benefit of this indemnity unless, at the commencement of the voyage, the ship was seaworthy.

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Running Days

Per Lord Esher in Nielsen v Wait (1885) 16 QBD 67 at p.72:

"Running days" are those days, on which a ship in the ordina course is running. It is true that when they are lay days, they do not take effect under charterparty until the ship has done running; but the parties are describing the days about wh they are talking, namely, days in a port, according to the phraseology which they use with regar to a ship at sea. "Running days" therefore mean the whole of every day when a ship is running.

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